The perspectives provided in this report are based on the original probabilistic risk analyses ( P u s ) performed by the licensees for their Individual Plant Examinations (IPEs). In many cases licensees updated these analyses to reflect plant changes and, in some cases, to incorporate staff concerns, as noted in the staff evaluation report (SER) of the licensee's IPE. For some of these PRAs, the results (e.g., core damage frequencies (CDFs) and dominant sequences) changed. Furthermore, several licensees provided as part of their comments on Draft NUREG-1560 information regarding revised analyses and plant changes. These changes are not reflected in the body of this report; they are provided, however, in this Appendix.
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App B. IPE Updates The report includes presentation material distributed at the meeting and summarizes the discussion periods during which questions were raised and responses provided. In addition, three sets of written comments were submitted at the meeting. These comments are included in Appendix C or the Workshop Summary Report. The authors and organizations submitting these comments are also listed in Table C .l (Items #23 -26).
In response to the request for comments, the NRC staff received 23 letters.
The authors and organizations submitting these letters are listed in Table C .l. All letters received are available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room. (2) Some comments were observations in nature and did not appear to solicit a response nor seek a revision to the text of the report. These comments are also not reproduced in this appendix with staff response. The comments are available in the NRC Public Document Room.
(3) Other comments address insights, interpretations and perspectives drawn in the draft NUREG-1560. In some cases, the commentors were concerned that the conclusions were unsubstantiated. In other cases, commentors were concerned about policy implications. For these comments, summaries were developed that captured the concern and an NRC staff response to the comment is provided. These comments and associated responses are provided in the following sections. The specific comments are available in the NRC Public Document Room.
Some of the comments discussed in the following sections are more general in nature and applied to insights, interpretations, etc. discussed in more than one chapter of the report. Comments of this nature can, therefore, appear in several sections of this appendix. An attempt is made in each section to identify those comments that apply to other parts of the NUREG.
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C.2 Chapters 2 and 9: Impact of the IPE Program on Reactor Safety
In addition to comments identifying factual errors in these chapters which were corrected, the following general comments were received. These comments and the NRC response are provided below.
1. Comment: Numerous erroneous claims of general applicability of vulnerabilities are made in the report, Implying generic applicability of vulnerabilities is inconsistent with the Individual Plant Examination (IPE) purpose which is to identify plant-specific vulnerabilities and costeffective improvements. (Reference: see Table  C .l, #8, 15, 20, 22)
Response:
It is true that the generic applicability of identified vulnerabilities cannot be ascertained. In addition, there is no consistent definition of vulnerability used in the IPEs. Further, variability in plant design and operation, as well as different modeling assumptions, can make a vulnerability unique to a particular plant. Therefore, statements regarding generic applicability of vulnerabilities have been rephrased in the NUREG. The purpose of presenting the vulnerabilities and associated plant improvements identified by the licensees is so that all of the licensees may benefit from considering these enhancements as means of improving the safety at their plant in a costeffective manner.
Comment: Claims that plant improvements
identified by one licensee could be implemented by other plants should not be made. Plant improvements should not be implementedwithout a full assessment of induced competing risks and the expenditure of resources required that may far outweigh any safety benefit gained. (Reference:
see Table C . 1 , # 15) c-4
3.
Response:
All statements about generic application of plant improvements have been rephrased in the NUREG.
As with the identification of vulnerabilities, the purpose for discussing identified plant improvements is so that all licensees can benefit by considering their potential implementation at their plant to improve plant safety. A prudent evaluation by a licensee of the benefit of plant improvements identified by other plants would involve both cost-benefit and competing risk considerations.
Comment: Listing improvement implementation by the licensees as of the date of the IPE submittal is misleading because many plant changes have occurred since the initial IPE submittals. (Reference: see Table C 
C.3 Chapters 3 and 11: IPE Results Perspectives: Core Damage Frequency
Many comments were received concerning the accuracy of the information provided in these chapters or the insights that were identified. Corrections were made to the text where appropriate. In addition, several general comments were provided on the content of this chapter. These comments and an associated response are provided below.
1.

2.
Comment:
The reported core damage frequencies (CDFs) and dominant contributors do not reflect updated probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) results. Many utilities have updated their PRAs one or more times in response to plant design and procedure changes. In addition, many licensees have provided the NRC with revised IPE submittals some with extensive modeling changes and changes in the risk contributors and CDF. To correctly reflect insights from the IPEs requires consideration of supplementary submittals as well. (Reference: see Table C .l, #1, 12, 15, 22) Response:
Because many plant P U S are being constantly updated to reflect the current plant design and operation, it is not practical to constantly update NUREG-1560 to incorporate new insights. NUREG-1560 is, and will remain, a compilation of the calculated CDFs and insights obtained from the original IPE submittals. However, information from updated IPE submittals is provided in Appendix B.
In comparing the plants, the categorization of boiling water reactors (BWRs)
solely by vintage, pressurized water reactors (PWRs) by nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) vendor, and Westinghouse PWRs by the number of loops is not appropriate and can lead to misinterpretation of results. It would be valuable to also look at the results based on a categorizationof architectlengineerandor builder and also age of plant to see if variations can be explained within each NSSS category. Further subgrouping of plants according to similar design characteristics (e.g., emergency core cooling system, ECCS, designs) could be possible.
(Reference: see Table C . 1 , # 16)
Early in the IPE Insights Program, the plants were grouped by architectlengineer and the IPE CDFs within and among these groups were c-5
NUREG-1560 compared. It was found that comparison of results on this basis was not productive because there is considerable design variability even among plants designed by the same architecdengineer. A decision was made to perform the analysis using plant groups based upon the NSSS vendor to account for basic NSSS design differences. The BWRs were further subcategorized by vintage to account for differences in ECCS design. The Westinghouse plants were grouped according to the number of loops since the ECCS and other general plant features for the plants in each of these groups are generally the same (see Table 10 .3). It is recognized that the balance of plant including support systems for plants in each of the designated groups can be different and skew any comparison of the results for a plant group. The NUREG identifies that these plant-specific features impact the results and draws the appropriate conclusions on the resulting insights. Finally, it is recognized that further subcategorization of plants according to a selected parameter could be made. However, variability in other parameters would likely impact that comparison. Because of this fact and also due to resource limitations, further subcategorization was not pursued.
The degree to which a search for variability associated with plant design differences has been made is questionable. The NUREG states that important design features, operator actions, and model assumptions all impact the variability in results. However, few model assumptions are identified. As is well known, substantial differences in PRA results occur because of balance-of-plant and support system design differences despite similarities in NSSS design. Therefore, it is judged that there is no basis to assert that the basis for observed variability is anything but dominated by plant differences in design, procedures, and training.
(Reference: see Table C . 1, # 15)
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Whether plant-specific desigdoperational differences or modeling assumptions are dominant factors in explaining the variability is not always obvious. However, it is believed that either or both can play a significant role in the variability for certain accident types. In many cases, a judgment is made in the NUREG on which is the dominant factor for an accident class for a plant group. The NUREG identifies that a significant amount of variability is due to support system and other plant-specific desigdoperational differences. Many of these desigdoperational differences are highlighted in the report. However, it is also clear that modeling assumptions play an important part in the variability. In some cases, because of limited documentation in the IPE submittals, it is not clear if the modeling assumption really reflects a design or operational difference. For example, many licensees did not credit an alternate coolant injection system because they did not perform an analysis of whether or not it would be successful.
The neglect of the potential use of this system is a model assumption until it is shown that, because of plant-specific factors, such a system could not be used. For other cases, it is clear that a model assumption is being made. For example, many licensees assumed that the DC bus load shedding would always successfully occur during a station blackout.
Comment:
The choice of success criteria has a major impact on the variability of the CDF results in a given category of plants. This is not mentioned in the NUREG. Some utilities working with smaller PRA vendors had more stringent success (i.e., conservative) criteria than others who worked with reactor vendors and had access to information that allowed for less conservative success criteria. Also, some larger utilities had the resources to perform the necessary analyses to establish a less conservative success criteria where other utilities did not have such resources and chose to use a conservative success criteria. (Reference: see Table C . 1, #16)
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App C. Comments and Responses
The NUREG identifies where success criteria assumptions impact the variability of the calculated CDFs. As mentioned in the response to the previous comment, because of limited documentation in the submittals, it was not always clear if differences in success criteria were due to design differences or modeling assumptions. The basis for not crediting a system (and in some cases, for crediting a system) or for the operating requirements of a credited system (including support system requirements) were not always documented in the submittals. The CDF evaluation thus made no attempt to validate the differences in success criteria but simply reported its impact on the variability on the results. Also, Chapters 10 and 14 in the NUREG discusses the importance of success criteria to the results in general terms.
The NUREG should address the criteria used to determine what constitutes core damage. Many IPEs use core uncovery while others use a peak cladding temperature of 2200°F. This is important in that it impacts what equipment can be used to avoid core damage.
(Reference: see Table C .l, #11, 15)
The impact of the definition of core damage on success criteria is discussed in general terms in Chapters 10 and 14. Specific impacts on the variability of the reported CDF definitions were not addressed because insufficient information was provided in the IPE submittals.
6. Comment: A discussion on how the component failure rates and the common cause failure rates impact the results is missing from the NUREG.
This could be particularly important for assessing the importance of station blackout (SBO) since the reliability of on-site emergency AC power is critical. (Reference: see Table C .l, #16) c-7
7.
Because of the variability in the IPE modeling, it is not possible to always ascertain the impact of component failure rates and common cause failure rates. However, these factors were considered in establishing the parameters affecting the variability in the reported CDFs. Selected comparisons were made and, as discussed in Chapter 1 1, these failure rates were found to be important to the CDF variability. Also, based on a limited survey of data, Chapter 14 indicates that a wide variety of failure rates were identified in the IPEs for some components. This variability applies not only to plant-specific data but also to generic failure rates identified in the submittals. Figure C. 1 indicates that all three models predict small probabilities of leaks and core uncovery for early times (less than about 3 hours).
Because of this, differences between the three models do not have a significant impact on CDF for this early time period. However, for later times, the differences are more significant. The Westinghouse models generally predict much smaller probabilities for core uncovery for time periods greater than approximately 3 to 3.5 hours, particularly for cases where the vessel is depressurized. For scenarios where the vessel is not depressurized, however, the probabilities predicted by the Westinghouse models rise sharply at about 8 hours, so that the three models give similar probabilities at that time.
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The fact that seal LOCAs occur in all three models does not mean that the impact on the CDF will be the same in both cases. As noted earlier, none of the models result in a significant contribution to CDF in the first three hours. However, unlike the Westinghouse models, the NUREG-1150 model can result in significant contributions to CDF based on core uncovery in the 3 -8 hour time frame. For example, in this time frame during a station blackout, the core is likely being cooled by auxiliary feedwater, given that battery power is still available. Therefore, without a seal LOCA, core damage would not be expected during this time m e . For times past 8 hours, all three models predict a high probability of a seal LOCA leading to core uncovery. However, for these longer times, battery depletion would have occurred at most Westinghouse plants, leading to loss of heat removal and boiloff. Therefore, if AC power recovery does not occur, core damage will result whether or not a seal LOCA is present. In this situation, the station blackout CDF is not affected by small seal LOCAs that would result in core uncovery at times greater than 8 hours. The precise impact of the model differences is plant-specific, depending on battery depletion times and AC power recovery alternatives. Similar impacts occur for non-station blackout scenarios (e.g., loss of component cooling water events) where the seal leakage rate impacts the time available for other recovery actions such as arranging alternate charging pump cooling. Response:
A decision was made to report the CDFs to one significant figure (to provide consistency) and are based on the actual values reported in the IPE submittals.
C.4 Chapters 4 and 12: IPE
Results Perspectives: Containment Performance 1. Comment: Conditional containment failure probability (CCFP) is not a good measure of safety performance. The use of conditional measures implies an independence between the systems which prevent core damage and the systems which prevent containment failure which is part of the design of the current generation of light water reactors. Plants with relatively higher CCFPs are not necessarily less safe than those with relatively lower CCFPs. The measures which impact public safety are related to the frequency of releases from the containment. (Reference: see Table C .l, #11, 12, 22, 23)
Response:
One of the main objectives of the chapters in NUREG-1 560 related to containment performance is to obtain perspectives on the performance of the various containment types independent from other plant features. For this purpose, the CCFP is a useful parameter since it decouples containment failure from core damage frequency. This was also recognized by the majority of licensees since CCFPs are reported directly in most of the IPE submittals. Ideally, the comparison of containment performance among different IPEs would be accomplished by comparing CCFPs for individual plant damage states. However, such a comparison is not possible since the definition of the plant damage states was left to the individual analyst and thus varies fiom IPE to IPE. NUREG-1560 also recognizes that the probability of containment bypass is not a measure of containment performance in the same way that isolation or structural failure of the containment is. Therefore, the NUREG separates the conditional probabilities of containment bypass and containment "failure" when making comparisons. The importance of containment failure frequency is acknowledged in Chapter 12 of the NUREG where comparisons of containment failure frequencies as well as release frequencies are also presented. The NUREG does not draw conclusions or make implications regarding overall plant safety based on CCFPs. Containment failure probabilities are used only to compare the containment performance among plants with the same type of containment and among different containment types. For this purpose the CCFP is the best suited parameter.
Comment:
The report utilizes at least five different figures of merit in characterizing containment performance. It is never clear which figure is most appropriate or why. The figures include: total conditional containment failure probability, conditional probability of various containment release types (bypass, early failure, late failure), frequency of bypass and early release, conditional probability of "significant early release," and frequency of releases with the potential to cause early fatalities. (Reference: see Table C . 1, #22)
Response:
NUREG-1560 uses various parameters related to containment performance in different chapters of the report depending on the purpose of the comparisons to be made and the perspectives to be obtained. There is no single "most appropriate" containment performance figure of merit for the whole report, nor should there be. Those parameters which best served to illustrate the points to be made for the issues at hand were chosen in different sections of the report. Total conditional containment failure probability is not used in the NUREG. For purposes of obtaining perspectives on containment performance, conditional probabilities of containment bypass, The EPRI report on MAAP acknowledges "one should recognize that M A P cannot and does not contain detailed models for all phenomena. As noted above, other system level codes share this limitation, and this is one reason why the IPE guidance called for proper sensitivity studies to be conducted as part of the Level 2 analysis. In some cases MAAP was applied by the IPE analysts in a way that did not follow industry recommended guidelines. NRC noted "...the adequacy of the AUAP 3.0B code for use in the IPEs.. . 'I but also stated that '7icensees ... bear the burden of proof that they have applied the code properly, and that they meet the intent of the IPE generic letter."
4.
5.
Regarding the industry position papers, their application in an IPE to qualitatively dismiss a number of accident progression phenomena, without any sensitivity considerations, or without any understanding of the uncertainty associated with the different phenomena, is not in line with the intent of Generic Letter 88-20. This approach was less helpful in fostering a licensee's appreciation and understanding of severe accident behavior than a proper application of MAAP.
Comment: Results are presented by reactor and containment type and NSSS. It would be valuable to also look at the architecdengineer or builder to explain the variation in reported results. (Reference: see Table C .l, #16)
Early in the IPE Insights Program a decision was made to group the containment performance results under the five common containment classes used in the United States. Containment response to severe accidents has been found to correlate to these five containment classes as illustrated in the NRC's Containment Performance Improvement program.
In discussing containment performanceperspectives, NUREG-1560 identifies those architecuengineer specific containment construction features which play a significant role in the IPE analysis, as reported in the IPE submittals. These features include the containment material, layout of reactor cavity, and location of sumps and drain lines.
Comment: It is judged that there is no basis in NUREG-1560 to assert that the observed variability in the IPE results is anything but dominated by plant differences in design, procedure, and training. (Reference: see Table  C .1, #15)
In discussing containment performance eermectives. NUREG-1560 identifies the plant NUREG-1560 c-12 specific differences described in the IPE submittals which lead to some of the variability in the reported results. However, it is clear that modeling assumptions also play an important role in the observed variability in containment performance. Assumptions regarding the amount and composition of core material exiting from the reactor vessel, the coolability of this debris, and the pressure and temperature rise in the containment due to core debris dispersal are examples of modeling assumptions which had a significant influence on the assessment of containment performance. Other assumptions include the likelihood of in-vessel recovery of the accident, including the likelihood of retaining the core debris in the reactor vessel via external cooling of the vessel.
Comment:
It would seem prudent to avoid misinterpretations by providing the specific NRC assumptions used in extrapolating IPE submitted words to the construction of the comparisons among plant results in NUREG-1560. These
The above comment on the treatment of dynamic failure modes is not clear, and no further clarification was provided at the workshop; consequently, no changes were made to NUREG-1560.
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Response:
There exists detailed discussion in the appropriate sections of Chapters 4 and 12 of NUREG-1560 on:
how venting was grouped to the different containment failure modes.
how "early" and "late" was defined in the comparison of failure modes and releases.
how multiple containment failure modes were treated as they were reported in the IPE submittal (Le. whichever failure mode was considered dominant in the submittal base case results was the one used in NUREG-1560).
C.5 Chapters 5 and 13: IPE assumptions would include:
What the relationship of containment vent treatment is to the CCFP, the early releases, and other measures of risk;
what the correlation is between each IPE result for early and late releases and their definition of "early" and "late";
how the assignment of multiple containment failure modes affects the assignment of the allocation of failure modes in comparisons (e.g., shell melt-through following wetwell failure); and defining the treatment of dynamic failure modes and their associated failure locations as it relates to inferences about failure locations and timing. Beference: see Table  C .l, #15)
Results Perspectives: Human Performance 1. Comment: It is stated in the report that in most cases there is little evidence that the human reliability analysis (HRA) quantification method per se has a major impact on the results. This seems to imply that "the impact of HRA on PSA can best be described as indeterminate" or "that the HRA seems to have little efect on the results of the PRA." If this is the case, why are the HRAs identified as important shortcomings of the IPEs and why is the quality of the HRAs a concern. (Reference: see Table C .l, #8, 11, 12, 15, 21)
Response:
The interpretation that "the impact of HRA on PSA can best be described as indeterminate" or Initiator and sequence-specific factors and dependencies will also lead to variability in HEPs. Moreover, some plants only used "screening values" in modeling some of the examined events. On the basis of these and other factors, the commentors indicated that such variability would be expected.
This conclusion is, at least in part, one point the staff was trying to make and which was stated in the report. That is, there are "reasonable explanations for much of the observedvuriability in HEPs across plants. In other words, the rather striking degree of variability, in at least nominally similar human actions, is based to some extent on valid differences. From this perspective it can be argued that the licensees attempted to consider relevant factors in obtaining the HEPs for operator actions and that the results of the HRAs performed by the different licensees were generally consistent and therefore useful. In fact, the staff does not in general disagree with this conclusion.
However, another conclusion reached by the staff and documented in this report was that not 4 of NUREG-1 560 C-14 the variability in the examined HEPs was easily explained. That is, after "acceptab1e"reasons for variation were considered, there still appeared to be some degree of unexplained variation the HEPs (see Chapter 13). While some of this variation would be expected due to the lack of precision in existing HRA methods, it is also possible that some of the variation was due to factors such as analyst biases, invalid HRA assumptions made by analysts performing the HRAs, or superficial HRA analyses that failed to adequately examine and model the potential for human error (e.g., through careful consideration of plant-specific performance shaping factors (PSFs), consideration of dependencies, use of simulator exercises, etc). Due to the limited information provided in many submittals on the derivation of particular HEPs, it is difficult to determine the extent to which inappropriate factors actually influenced the derived HEPs. However, examinations of the submittals during the project indicated that not all licensees performed quality HRAs. That is, not all licensees applied the existing HRA methods as well as they could have. For example, they did not always consider dependencies, appropriately assess the impact of time availability, or carefully consider plant-specific PSFs. Some failed to model pre-initiator actions and others did not conduct simulator exercises or perform walkdowns and timing of operator actions to be conducted outside the control room, etc. The conclusion that not all licensees conducted highquality HRAs is further documented in some of the staff evaluation reports (SERs) that have been issued on the submittals. Some submittals indicated as having met the intent of Generic Letter 88-20 were found to have various weaknesses that could have influenced the HEPs obtained for particular events.
While the degree of consistency in HEPs obtained for similar human actions in similar contexts suggests that in general the HRA results from the IPEs were useful in terms of meeting the intent of Generic Letter 88-20, it should be krther noted that even when reasonable consistency exists, it is not necessarily the case that all the HEPs calculated by a particular plant were realistic and valid for that plant. As noted in Chapters 5 and 13, reasonable consistency can be obtained in HRA without necessarily producing valid HEPs. An HEP is only valid to the extent that a correct and thorough application of HRA principles has occurred. For example, if a licensee simply assumed (without adequate analysis) that their plant is "average" in terms of many of the relevant PSFs for a given event, but then does appropriately consider the time available for the event in a given context, the value obtained may be similar to those obtained for other plants with similar time frames for the event. Yet, the resulting value may be optimistic or pessimistic relative to the value that would have been obtained if the licensee had conducted a detailed examination of the relevant plantspecific factors. Thus, while the degree of consistency obtained by the licensees is encouraging regarding the ability to compare the results of the IPEs, and while many licensees performed excellent HRAs, the fact that some licensees did not perform as thorough HRAs as possible given the state-of-the-art in HRA at the time, means that the results are not as good as they might have been. It does not mean that individual licensees and the industry in general did not obtain important information from performing the IPEs.
Comment:
By questioning the quality of the HRAs performed for the IPEs, NUREG-1560 seems to imply that the licensees should have attemptedto extend the state-of-the-artin HRA in order to obtain quality results. (Reference: see Table C .l, #8, 11, 21)
Response:
The staff believes that the state-of-the-art in HRA at the time of the IPEs was adequate for the intent of Generic Letter 88-20. The shortcomings related to the HRAs performed for the IPEs were in how the existing methods were applied, rather than the methods themselves. Of course, this
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NUREG-1560 position does not imply that improvements are not needed in HRA, but rather that useful results can be obtained with thoughtful and thorough applications of existing methods.
Comment:
The NRC needs to initiate a number of policy and research activities to address shortcomings both in the NRC's attitudes and strategies for ensuring that the licensees maintain safe plants and in the development and use of PRA and HRA methods and techniques. These activities (summarized) include establishing a regulatory attitude that encourages the licensees to be pro-active rather than reactive (to the NRC) in ensuring plant safety, encouraging more thorough and realistic HRAs, supporting the development of multiple new approaches to HRA
(which include more effective use of simulators), reevaluation of the real contribution of common cause to risk, reevaluating the use of Bayesian updating during "period of rapid changes in maintenance," and investigating the impact of management and organizational factors on plant safety. (Reference: see Table C .1, #4)
Response:
The author (of the comments summarized above) acknowledged that the "comments are not just on the NUREG document itselJ but are also directed towards some overall aspects of PRAs and HMs. 'I However, none of the comments appear to address the NUREG itself. Nevertheless the NRC does currently have programs addressing each of the issues raised by the author, e.g., development of improved HRA methods and consideration of the impact of management and organizational factors on plant safety. Further, the NRC staff has reviewed the comments and will consider them in future directions of research.
C.6 Chapters 6 and 14: IPE Models and Methods Perspectives
Several comments were received expressing technical disagreement with some of the information provided in these chapters. The text was revised where appropriate. In addition, several general comments were provided on the content of these chapters. These comment and associatedresponses are provided below.
Comment:
Numerous comments were received on the description of a "quality" PRA in Chapters 6 and 14 and on the comparison of the IPEs to a quality PRA in Chapters 6 and 15 of the draft NUREG. Several commentors felt that these chapters were inappropriate for NUREG-1560 and that they should be deleted from the final report. This recommendation was largely driven by the assumption that the attributes of a "quality" PRA were intended to be standards or requirements and that all the attributes had to be met prior to using PRAs in future risk-informed regulatory activities. Given that some commentors felt that the PRA attributes were too demanding, overly prescriptive and beyond the current state-of-the-art, it follows that if they were assumed to be requirements then they could be interpreted as a significant burden on the industry. Several comments emphasized that the scope and attributes of a PRA to be used for riskinformed regulatory activities should be commensurate with the application. This implies that PRAs with significantly less attributes and of more limited scope than the PRA described in NUREG-1560 would be acceptable for riskinformed applications.
Other commentors stressed that any applications of the PRA attributes in NUREG-1560 to the creation of an industry standard should be viewed as developmental in nature. An industry-wide standard for PRA quality should be based on a broader and more deliberate development effort that involves practitioners from various NUREG-1560 (2-16 organizations. (Reference: see Table C.l, #1 , 2, 8, 9, 15, 16, 20, 22 and 26) Response:
Chapters 6, 14 and 15 of draft NUREG-1560 have been significantly revised for the final report. Specifically, Chapters 14 and 15 have been replaced with a new Chapter 14, and references to the use of the IPEs in risk-informed regulation have been removed. Chapters 6 and 14 in the final report summarize PRA characteristics and state that they:
are not "standards" nor do they represent regulatory guidance.
are included only as a benchmark in order to draw perspectives on the models and methods used in the IPEs.
do not define the needed quality or scope of the PRA elements needed for a particular regulatory application.
Several comments were related to the following statement in draft NUREG-1560, "...and other utility personnel are. excludedfrom the peer review team." This statement was interpreted by some commentors as implying that no employees of any utility can serve as a peer reviewer. (Reference: see Table C.1, #1, 8, 12, 15, 16, 20 and 22) Response:
This interpretation was not intended. The statement was included simply to indicate that it would be inappropriate for utility staff to be part of the PRA peer review team for plants owned and operated by their utility. NUREG-1560 has been revised accordingly.
C.7 Section 7.1 and Chapter 15: Safety Goal Implications
Several comments were received expressing technical disagreement with some of the information provided in these chapters. The text was revised where appropriate. In addition, several general comments were provided on the content of these chapters. These comments and associated responses are provided below.
Comment:
The concern is that the results reported in the original IPE submittals are not current and could be misleading when compared to the Safety Goals. Response:
NUREG-1560 has been revised to clarify that the perspectives on the safety goal are based on the original IPEsPRAs which may have subsequently changed. However, the results quoted in NUREG-1560 will not be revised. New information obtained by the staff will be included in NUREG-1560 (see Appendix B). In the case of the safety goal comparisons if any of the plants that were identified as approaching the early fatality QHO submit revised results, this will be noted in Chapter 7 and 15 and the reader will be directed to the appendix. Table C . 1 , #16)
NUREG-1560 has been revised to clarify that NUREG-1 150 containment results were not used to link the IPE results to the safety goals. For early fatality risk, a two step process was used.
In the first step, the frequencies of early containment failure and bypass were obtained fiom the IPEs and plants with low frequencies (<lO"/ry) were screened out from further consideration. For the remaining plants, the frequencies of source terms with relatively large release fractions (>0.03 Cs, I, Te) were obtained.
The source term frequencies were then adjusted for population and compared to the goal.
There is an implication in the report that the only way a comparison can be made to the "Safety Goal" is to have a Level 3 PRA.
Such a PRA was never mandated, requested or suggested by the NRC and there are a number of ways to compare to the Safety Goal other than having a Level 3 PRA. The NUREG could address how the NRC and industry (there are several EPRI documents and other papers, positions and reports) have defined or linked the NRC "Safety Goal" in terms of Level 1 and 2 surrogate indicators. (Reference: see Table C . 1,
#15, 21)
The approach used by the staff in Chapters 7 and 15 of NUREG-1560 was based on using Level 1 and 2 surrogate indicators to link the IPE results to the safety goals. The wording in Section 6.4 has, therefore, been changed to make it clear that a Level 3 PRA is not the only way to make a comparison to the safety Goals. before planning follow-up activities. (Reference: see Table C . 1, #20, 22)
Response:
The IPE results and insights provide a useful source of information for identifying areas where follow-up activities might be warranted. The informationcontainedinNUREG-1560, however, is merely a starting point and is by no means the sole basis for regulatory decisions. Before any plant-specific actions are taken, the best available information will be considered, including any revisions to the original IPE submittals, recognizing that most of the newer information
has not yet received staff review. Further, any NUREG-1560 (2-20 proposed regulatory actions are subject to the Backfit Rule as described in lOCFR50.109.
Comment:
The NRC staff's approach in looking at CDF and CCFP as independent factors is incorrect. It assumes the existence of either a high CDF or high CCFP is evidence on its own of a potential concern. In reality, the two factors should be looked at together. They are each a part of the overall input to risk, which should be the figure of merit (the CDFKCFP criteria do not have any established technical connection to the QHOs of the Safety Goal). (Reference: see Table C . 1, #8, 22)
Response:
The major objectives of the IPE Insights Program are outlined in both the Forward and Introduction of NUREG-1560. For at least one of those objectives (i.e., providing perspectives on plant feature and assumptions that play a role in the estimation of CDF, containment performance and human performance), it is useful to look at CDF and CCFP separately. The use of these parameters in NUREG-1560 does not imply that a high value for either parameter alone is a potential concern or will be the basis for regulatory decisions. Instead, the use of these parameters allows the staff to focus individually on the Level 1 and Level 2 analyses performed for the IPEs, thereby accomplishing the objectives noted above.
Comment:
Concerning any follow-up regulatory activities, it's suggested that the investigation and regulatory considerations not be limited just to the high CDF or CCFP issues. Areas where the risk impact is small and the safety benefit is not appreciable should also be investigated for reduced regulatory burden. (Reference: see Table  C .l, #6, 16)
Response:
The primary focus of the NRC is to assure the safety of the public. Therefore, it is natural that the NRC tends to be more concerned with eliminating vulnerabilities and reducing risks than with reducing burden. However, the latter objective is desirable and the NRC encourages the industry to submit requests for reduced regulatory burdens in areas where they believe that risks are low and substantial cost savings can be achieved.
Comment:
The discussion of the Maintenance Rule says it is acceptable to use the IPEs to determine risk significant systems. However, this is not compatible with the findings about the usefulness of the IPEs for risk-informed regulation. Likewise, the NRC implies that for inspection purposes the IPEs are adequate for them to target areas for plant-specific inspections but NUREG-1560 states that the PRAs are only adequate to identify dominant accident sequence types and their relative importance. This seems inconsistent. Furthermore, the NRC seems to be attempting to use PRA information in a selective manner, where it serves their purposes.
(Reference: see Table C . 1 , #22)
Response:
References to the use of the IPEs in riskinformed regulation have been removed ffom the final version of NUREG-1560. Issues related to the quality and scope of PRAs needed for riskinformed regulation are discussed in the staff regulatory guides, and standard review plans. The role of the IPEs in risk-informed regulation will be determined in the context of these documents, not NUREG-1 560.
Comment:
The report implies that until "quality" PRA requirements are fully met, PRAs cannot be used for any regulatory purposes. If that is the case, "as is" PRAs are inappropriate to support such areas as the Maintenance Rule and Technical Specification changes. Such an interpretation is counterproductive and is not supportive of the PRA Policy that looks to enhance use of PRA in regulation commensurate with the state-of-the-art technology. Recognized c-2 1 NUREG-1560 weaknesses, and tools to deal with those weaknesses delineated in the Standard Review Plan makes the "as is" PRA applicable for a wide variety of applications while "quality" PRA requirements are phased in. Waiting until perfect "quality" of PRA is achieved before utilizing the results is impractical. It is expected that "quality" and "standardization will evolve, not through a priori definition, but through fiequent, repeated application and peer review of PRAs.
(Reference: see Table C . 1 , # 15, 17)
Response:
The comment is similar to comments received on Chapters 6 and 14 (refer to Comment #1 in Section C.6). These chapters and Chapter 8 have been significantly revised for the final report. It was not intended to imply that all the attributes in drafi NUREG-1560 have to be met before a PRA can be used to support risk-informed regulatory applications. 
